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An Identity Crisis: Regime Legitimacy and the
Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China
SCOTT J. PALMER'

Since Deng Xiaoping first defined the trajectory of "socialist
modernization" in December 1978, the creation of an effective body of
intellectual property law has become a crucial component in the Chinese
government's efforts at economic reform.' The development of a "socialist
legal system" was initially conceived as a complement to new efforts at
economic reform and as a source of legitimacy for the government's reform
policies In this regard, the promulgation of new patent, copyright, and
trademark laws, as well as China's accession to multilateral intellectual
property treaty regimes, not only represent governmental efforts to facilitate
foreign investment and transfer of technology, but also represent a way for the
government to establish and legitimate associated "modernization" and reform
policies. '
Despite the proliferation of formal legal protections for intellectual
property, China's lack of adequate protections has become a central issue in
ongoing trade disputes with the United States. Notwithstanding a bilateral
Memorandum of Understanding between China and the United States;
revisions of patent and trademark law; accession to the Berne, Geneva, and
Universal Copyright Conventions; the promulgation of unfair competition
laws; and a Regulation on Customs Protection for Intellectual PropertyChina's inability to secure intellectual property protections continue to worry
the United States, even after ostensibly achieving the minimum substantive
standards for member states of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as set
forth in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property

Rights (TRIPS).
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1. Communique ofthe Third Plenary Session ofthe Eleventh Central Committee ofthe Communist
Party ofChina [hereinafter Communique], in THE CHINA READER 21-29 (Orville Schell et al. eds., 1999).
2. Pitman B. Potter, Ridingthe Tiger: Legitimacy and Legal Culture in Post-Mao China, 1994 THE

CHINA QuARTERLY 325, 325.
3. The Communique announced the "four modernizations" as part of the "general task" of a new
phase in history and the "people's aspirations." The four modernizations include the modernization of
agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. Communique, supra note 1, at 21-22.
4. The TRIPS agreement is a product of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
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The Chinese government has found itself in a precarious position. It has
created an elaborate U.S.-inspired intellectual property legal regime without
the political and social foundations to insure its effective enforcement.
Although China's economic reforms have been gradual,' some critics have
argued that China's current system of intellectual property protection is more
of a wish list for foreign investors than a realistic and effective system of
enforceable rules to protect actual rights. Economic pressures and the threat
of U.S.-imposed trade sanctions have provided much of the impetus for the
recent development of intellectual property laws in China, but forces of social
and political fragmentation have thrown Beijing's agenda in stark contrast to
popular viewpoints and practices. The government has initiated changes, the
terms of which it cannot easily control, delineating rules for holders of foreign
and domestic "rights." It has failed, however, to establish a coherent
enforcement regime that satisfies the expectations of foreign and domestic
parties seeking protection of such rights.6 Indeed, the future of intellectual
property protection in China depends on how China will contend with a host
of social, political and economic challenges, which will not miraculously
disappear upon accession to the WTO.
This note will survey the development of the current intellectual property
laws in China. It will accentuate social, economic, and political factors that
inform the current uncertainty over the future of intellectual property rights,
especially in light of China's impending accession to the WTO. Section I will
discuss the role of the socialist legal system in relation to the government's
goals of socialist modernization and present a working vocabulary for
evaluating the complex relationship between politics and law in China.
Section II will outline a brief history of the development of intellectual
property law since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central
Committee in 1978 and discuss relevant political and economic factors that
have informed the development of China's current laws. Readers familiar with
the recent history of intellectual property in China may wish to skip this
section or refer to it in regard to particular issues developed in Section III of
Trade (GAIT) and the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). See Agreement on

Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS], Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO], Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 IL.M. 81 (1994).
5. For a discussion of China's gradualist economic development policy, see SUN XIUPING, ET AL.,
THEORY AND REALITY OF TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY 7 (Gao Shanquan, et al. eds., 1995).
6. For a discussion of the differing treatment for of domestic rights holders as opposed to foreign
rights holders, see generally WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INCHINESE CIVILIZATION (1995).
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this note. Section I1] will discuss the primary social and political factors
contributing to the difficulty of enforcing intellectual property rights, and their
potential effect on the future of intellectual property protection in China. This
note will conclude with a critical evaluation of the politics of imagining
intellectual property rights in China and a final assessment of domestic
constraints on political culture that have limited China's ability to adequately
address its enforcement problems.
I. EVALUATING THE SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEM: TERMS AND PERSPECTIVES

The 1978 Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Communique)
contemplated the development of the socialist legal system, not only as a goal
in itself, but as a basis for the government's efforts at political and economic
reform.' The Communique set the stage for economic and political reforms
and announced a major policy departure from the Maoist emphasis on
"protracted revolutionary struggle."" This policy departure marked a shift from
government reliance on "mass movements" in an uninterrupted revolutionary
process as the basis for its leadership in favor of what Pitman Potter terms "an
avowed reverence for the rule of law."
The socialist legal system was conceptualized as a panacea against the
recurrence of chaos during the late-Maoist era--a proverbial "safeguard" for
the people's democracy'--and as a way for the government to justify its
actions in leading the country toward the realization of socialist modernization.
This, in effect, established a novel and precarious interdependency between
legal culture and political legitimacy in China. It was novel in that it diverged
from the monolithic political primacy of the Maoist era and precarious in that
it made political legitimacy contingent on forces essentially out of the
government's control.
Configuring the role of socialist legality in contemporary Chinese politics
by relating the "use" of legal reform to the promotion of economic change
7. See generally Communique, supra note I; See also Potter, supra note 2, at 325. "Particularly
within the PRC [People's Republic of China] it has been fashionable to regard the 3' plenum of December
1978 as the third great turning point in China's twentieth-century history, after the revolutions of 1911 and
1949." DAVID S.G. GOODMAN, DENG XIAOPING AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 90 (1994).
8. Communique. supra note I, at 27.
9. Potter, supranote 2, at 325. For a discussion of the failure of the Maoist developmental state and
the development of the ideology of the new reformers, see also GORDON WHITE, RIDING THE TIGER: THE
POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM INPOST-MAO CHINA 21-42 (1993).
10. Communique, supra note I at 26.
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exposes a "chicken and egg" problem that pervades discussions of political
and legal culture in contemporary China. Conceiving law as an instrument of
economic and social change as opposed to a nexus of institutions and texts
that develop "as a result of change elsewhere," reflects the fundamental
interpenetration of law and policy in China and serves as a fulcrum upon which
regime legitimacy hinges on the effects of legal reform." In the absence of
"democratic" institutions to inform policy decisions or a foundational or
constitutional apparatus to encourage and respond to social and institutional
feedback, the central government has essentially wagered its legitimacy on the
success of its economic and legal reforms.
The transition from a centrally-planned economy to one that is marketbased was envisioned in China as the ideal product of a progressive loosening
of state control over segments of the economy by "first establishing market
rules and regulations, and then developing the market."'" This policy reflects
China's gradual coordination of centrally-planned and loose-market
mechanisms, sometimes referred to as a "dual-track" reform procedure. The
socialist legal system is intended to grant various rights, facilitate the
development of new forms of property, and at the same time, account for the
primacy of state interests. 3 When rules and regulations are made public,
however, their basic principles are subject to evaluation by external standards
in a constantly changing social and economic context. The public
dissemination of legal rules inevitably leads to the possibility of contentious
interpretations and alternative uses of legal discourse, as well as potential
conflicts between the government's views and popular conceptions of the
4

law.1

Because the government insists that the legal system remain subservient
to the political needs of a single party, the likelihood for such conflict is great.
Potter explains that the Chinese government has gone to great lengths to "make
certain that popular notions about law do not overreach its own view that law
should be merely an instrument of rule rather than a set of generally applicable
'
principles that regulate the state as well as the people it governs.""'
He
11. JAMES C. F. WANG, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLTICS 147-48 (6th ed. 1999).
12. XlUPrNG, supra note 5, at 217. For an overview of China's approach to economic reform, see
Barry Naughton, The Pattern and LogicofChina's Economic Reform, in THE CHINA READER, supra note
1, at 300.
13. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 76; see also Jonathan Ocko, Copying, Culture, and Control: Chinese
Intellectual Property Law in Historical Context, 8 YALE J.L & HUMAN. 559, 565 (1996) (reviewing
ALFORD, supra note 6).
14. Potter, supra note 2, at 354-57.
15. Id. at 326.
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suggests that the vast use of "legal symbolism" during the 1989 Tiananmen
crisis to challenge the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) monopoly on
political power illustrates the persistent dangers of resting political legitimacy
on legal culture in China. The government's violent response to this
movement was a clear indication that it would not tolerate challenges to the
political primacy of the CCP. Its response also, in effect, served to underscore
its view that future economic growth would not be accompanied by any
fundamental political change. 6
Potter has likened the precarious interrelationship of law and political
legitimacy in China to riding a tiger that is difficult to dismount, in reference
to the popular Chinese idiom-qi hu nan xia."7 He evaluates the dynamics of
this relationship by comparing popular assimilation of regime notions about
socialist legality-focusing on notions of equality and justice and ideas about
the formation and enforcement of civil obligations that "reflect the application
of notions of law to policies of economic reform."' 8 He suggests that doctrinal
pronouncements about socialist legality "ring increasingly hollow" and
concludes:
The regime seems unable to control the tiger of legal reform
by inducing popular assimilation and acceptance of its views.
On the other hand, to adopt official doctrine to make it fit
more closely to popular views and ideals would entail
political sacrifices that the regime does not appear prepared to
make. The alternative is for it to diminish its reliance on the
rule of law (figuratively slaying the tiger like Wu Song in The
Water Margin), and rely instead on tradition, economic
development or some other basis for its claim to political
power. 9

16. JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODEN CHINA 747 (1990).
17. Potter, supra note 2, at 325. Potter is not the only scholar to use this idiom to express the
contingencies of regime legitimacy and government reform policies. Gordon White uses the idiom to reflect
the interrelationship of economic success with the "credibility" of the current political regime. See WHrTE,
supra note 9.
18. Potter, supra note 2,at 327.
19. Id. at 358. It has been argued that Beijing has traded economic development for the surrender of
absolute control in its continual maintenance of power, essentially positioning economic development as
the crucial legitimizing force for a "decentralized" current regime. See generally WHITE,supra note 9;
David S.G. Goodman, How Open is Chinese Society?, in CHINA RISING: NATIONAIZATION AND
INTERDEPENDENCE, 27-30 (David Goodman & Gerald Segal eds., 1997).
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Potter claims that the ultimate result of the current regime's "inability to
induce popular assimilation of its views" is an increasingly "alienated legal
culture," which poses ongoing challenges to government efforts to "derive
political legitimacy from legal reform."2
One, perhaps central, characteristic of the current legal landscape in China
is the government's establishment of the interrelated doctrines of legal equality
and political inequality in the context of civil obligations. The new Contract
Law, for example, establishes the legal equality of contracting parties and
grants to all persons the capacity to enter into contracts.2 There is an
exception, however, which provides that contracts may not be formed when
they conflict with state policies or interests.' This clause actually operates as
a way for policy priorities to trump the capacity of parties to enter into
contracts based on legal equality." In other words, it articulates another aspect
of the interrelationship of law and politics, the incorporation of doctrines of
legal equality and political inequality into the legal system itself.
The regime's emphasis on rule of law as a basis for legitimacy also
exposes the government's actions to evaluation by foreign critics who assess
the successes and failures of China's legal regime in relation to the political
and legal values of Western democracies. China's legal system is peculiar in
that it now approximates the complexity of the legal systems of most
"developed" countries.2 ' It is, however, often criticized by Western nations for
its poor protection of human rights, its rampant corruption, and its inability to
provide adequate safeguards for foreign investment and intellectual property. 5
Western critics often tacitly assume an ideal "rule of law" system, replete with
its necessary prerequisites, to serve as the vantage point for evaluating the
evolution or shortcomings of China's legal culture. 6 For all practical
purposes, a primary limitation on the benefit of such evaluations for clarifying
and articulating points of issue in the Chinese context is that they often rest on
20. Potter, supra note 2, at 357.
21. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa [Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, as
adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People's Congress (Mar. 15,1999)], ch. 1, art. 3 (Feng
Xuewei, et al. trans., 1999).
22. Id. at ch. 1, art. 7. The relevant section reads, "[t]he parties shall abide by the laws and
administrative regulations, observe social ethics. Neither party may disrupt the socio-economic order or
damage the public interest." Id.
23. See Potter, supra note 2, at 342.
24. For a discussion of the political uses and normative implications of the term "developed," see
PAUL KNox & JOHN AGNEW, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 20-23 (2d ed. 1994).
25. Id.
26. For a general discussion of the cultural politics of conceiving Chinese culture in opposition to
Western, or "Occidental" culture, see EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978).
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certain fundamental social and cultural prerequisites. Such prerequisites are
historically and, at times, geographically contingent, and are neither "natural"
nor uncontested.27 Some scholars and critics have responded to the challenges
of political and legal comparative categories by attempting self-conscious and
localized discourses about such topics as human.rights, constitutionalism, and
democracy.
Michael Davis, for example, formulates the concept of
"constitutional indigenization" to explain the process whereby the
constitutional fundamentals of "democracy, human rights, and the rule of law"
are implanted and articulated through institutions steeped in the "diverse local
condition., 2 This model may support a more balanced critique of the interplay
of constitutional "fundamentals," such as rule of law, in the ongoing discourse
on China's political culture by initially accepting and assessing these
fundamentals in China's own terms.29
Davis' idea of "constitutional indiginization" is also useful because it
provides a model by which to evaluate the political culture of governments that
claim legitimacy by virtue of the constitutional essentials of democracy, rule
oflaw, and human rights. The current regime has adopted these categories and
has indeed contemplated that the socialist legal system serve as the protector
of the "people's democracy."" Moreover, the most recent constitution of the
People's Republic of China suggests that a Chinese citizen shares in a wide

range of human rights, comparable to those held by citizens of Western liberal
democracies. 3 Further, the 1978 Communique states that the "constitutional
27. Id. at 3-28.
28. Michael C. Davis, ConstitutionalismandPoliticalCulture: The Debate OverHuman Rights and
Asian Values, II HAv. HUM. RTs. J. 109, 138 (1998) [hereinafter Davis, Constitutionalism]. Davis has
argued that to properly understand the Chinese struggle with constitutional values and human rights, one
must begin with a "communications-based" theory. This theory "assumes that human rights values,
whether local or universal, are developed in the context of institutions and processes and the dynamics
between them," which confine the applicability and evolution of such values in a particular discursive
community, which in this case is the Chinese political/legal context. Michael C. Davis, Chinese
Perspectives on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES 5 (1995) [hereinafter Davis,
Chinese Perspectives]. For a more "universalist" account of how a modem constitutional democracy based
on liberal political ideals could and would be viewed as legitimate by peoples who do not share or accept
western liberal ideological cultural presumptions, see JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999).
29. For a discussion of how traditional Chinese thought militates against a strong theory of rights and
a legal and political system geared towards acknowledging and protecting those rights, see Randall P.
Peerenboom, What's Wrong with Chinese Rights?: Toward a Theory of Rights with Chinese
Characteristics,6 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 29 (1993).
30. Compare Communique, supra note i, at 26, with Wei Jingsheng, Democracy: The Fifth
Modernization, in THE CHINA READER, supra note 1, at 165.
31. For a discussion of these constitutional "rights" and the absence of legal safeguards to protect
them see Yu Hacheng, On Human Rights and Their Guarantee by Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE
VALUES, supra note 27, at 92-115.
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rights of citizens must be resolutely protected" and shall not be infringed upon
by anyone.32 For Davis, however, conflicts over community values and
interpretations of rules and regulations are necessary conditions for the
"indigenization" of liberal constitutional fundamentals, a process where the
political and legal fundamentals of democracy, human rights, and rule of law
become imbedded in and responsive to the "diverse local condition. '33 The
possibility of a public dialogue, when fostered by the aforementioned core
constitutional fundamentals, is an essential prerequisite for a healthy and
functioning constitutional system.3' Davis suggests that the development and
effective operation of a constitutional system is contingent on the ability of the
regime to foster a realistic discourse about current values and conditions in a
context where these constitutional fundamentals articulate the empowerments
and constraints of political power." He distinguishes the ideal system from
those of authoritarian regimes that rarely respect constitutional constraints and
"stifle this realistic conversation and then impose or 'implant' alleged
community values that are merely constructive of authoritarian power."3' 6
China's current regime, a system that establishes economic and social rules
minus the constitutional feedback loop envisioned by Davis, would most likely
map onto the authoritarian side of the constitutional continuum. The current
regime has refused to facilitate an open discourse on political values and yet
continues to promote the idea that the Party's interests represent those of the
people.37 At the same time, the regime's reliance on the rule of law as the
basis for its legitimacy has arguably alienated the Chinese government from
the people it claims to serve. In other words, China's current regime is in the
midst of a constitutional identity crisis, resting its legitimacy on a "people's
democracy" dependent on the rule of law and human rights yet resisting the
32. Communique, supra note 1, at 26; see also Peerenboom, supra note 29, at 29. China also became
signatory to the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESC) on October 27,
1997, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CPR) on October 5, 1998, ostensibly
entering into the ongoing human rights discourse associated with these two central covenants. China
ratified the ESC covenant on March 27, 2001, but has yet to ratify the more controversial CPR covenant.
See, e.g., M ultilateralTreaties Deposited with the Secretary General ofthe United Nations, Chapter IV,
at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bibletenglishintemetbible/partl/ chapterIV/chapterIV.asp (last visited
Apr. 4, 2001).
33. Davis, supra note 28, at 132.
34. Id. at 110-11. For a discussion of the "reasonablyjust constitutional society" as a realistic utopia
for non-liberal non-western peoples, see also RAwLs, supra note 28.
35. Davis, supra note 28, at 138.
36. Id.
37. Randall P. Peerenboom, Rights, Interests, and the Interests ofRights in China, 31 STAN. J. INT'L
L 359, 380 (1995).
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development of an indigenous and open constitutional dialogue about the
political values of this democracy. In such a context, popular viewpoints and
practices will always play second fiddle to party policy, and the development
of important legal infrastructure and a responsive, or "independent" judiciary
will be slow, if at all, in coming. Without a fundamental change in political
culture, the effectiveness of laws and regulations in China will be dependent
on the regime's ability to induce popular assimilation of its views, and without
a more open constitutional dialogue, those views will remain the whim ofparty
politics. A continuation of this arrangement will pose ongoing challenges to
regime attempts to derive legitimacy from legal reform. Moreover, it will
produce laws without the political and social foundations to insure their
effective enforcement, it will lead to persistent problems in attracting and
keeping foreign investment without the protection of an effective legal system,
and it will inspire the unending criticisms of the international community for
failing to live up to various "international" standards.3"
I1. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA:
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE THIRD PLENARY SESSION
OF THE ELEVENTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF

1978

Since 1978, China has embarked on a complete and gradual reorientation
of its economy, opening its markets to foreign investment and technology and
developing new laws to encourage and protect its economic development. 9
The development of a formalized legal system constituted a vehicle for
legitimation not only at home, but also abroad.'
The development of
intellectual property laws in China has served to reassure foreigners parting
with their technology and investment, and has channeled much needed capital
to fuel China's socialist modernization.41
China began redrafting its intellectual property laws in the late 1970's as
a response to the push toward modernizing science and technology, toward
developing an international market economy, and in response to a need for

38. Human rights is the classic example. For a discussion of the sources of conceptions of human
rights in China, see id. See generally Davis, Chinese Perspectives, supra note 28.
39. See KNOX ET AL., supra note 24, at 364.

40. See A.FORD, supra note 6, at 93.
41. Id.
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enhancing the position of intellectuals in China after the Cultural Revolution.42
Soon after the Carter administration reestablished formal diplomatic relations
with China, the United States and China signed the Implementing Accord on
Cooperation in the Field of High Energy Physics (Physics Accord).43 This
agreement related only to intellectual property protection in areas of scientific
cooperation. Moreover, at this time China lacked all but the most rudimentary
administrative protections for copyrights and inventions." It was, however, an
important first step toward developing a broad system of intellectual property
protection, and it was the first bilateral intellectual property agreement signed
by China in this regard. 45
Intellectual property relations between China and the United States in the
post-Mao era are said to have begun with the 1979 Agreement on Trade
Relations (1979 Agreement), which provided for equivalent treatment of
copyright, patent, and trademark protection in both countries. 4 China soon
began the task of implementing a broad-based intellectual property system that
would facilitate economic growth and establish the basic standards of
intellectual property protection contemplated by the 1979 Agreement and the
Physics Accord. In response to both internal economic pressures and its
obligations under both agreements, China joined the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) in 1980 and enacted the 1982 Trademark Law,
the 1984 Patent Law, and the 1990 Copyright Law.4 7
Data that supports the "success" of these first-generation intellectual
property laws tends to focus on the sheer number of patent and trademark
applications filed. 8 What is not so clear, however, is how successful these
42. Id. at 65. For a discussion of the treatment of intellectuals in the Cultural Revolution, see
generally SPENCE, supra note 16. For an outline ofpre-1970's early Soviet-styled intellectual property law
in China, see ALFORD, supra note 6, at 56-60.
43. For an excellent history of U.S. diplomatic relations with China, see PATRICK TYLER, A GREAT
WALL (1999). For a discussion of the Physics Accord, see Naigen Zhang, Intellectual Property Law
Enforcement in China: Trade Issues, Policies and Practices,8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 63, 70 (1997).
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates,Dragons,and U.S. IntellectualPropertyRights in China:Problems
andPerspectives ofChinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L REV. 1081, 1084 (1996).
47. Zhang, supra note 43, at 70.
48. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 82.
Official sources have exhibited great pride in the fact that during the eight years
prior to the revision of the 1984 Patent Law, over 284,000 applications were filed,
including over 40,000 from foreign parties representing some 65 jurisdictions, and
that during the decade between the 1983 Trademark Law's promulgation and its
most recent major revision, some 366,000 applications for trademark registration
were accepted, including more than 53,000 from foreign parties representing some
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early laws were in generating indigenous technology with a high commercial
value for patents and creating a strong and transparent market for domestic
trademarks. 49 For example, in 1992, foreigners obtained approximately twothirds of the invention patents granted.50 William Alford suggests that the
phenomenon of foreign multinationals securing a disproportionate share of
patents is not unusual for developing nations that have yet to generate
indigenous technology with high commercial value.5 He argues, however, that
even the most modest stimulation of Chinese inventiveness during this period
is all but indicated by these and other such numbers."2 He cites a 1985-1992
study of the 12,000 largest state-owned enterprises revealing that, on average,
they had filed less than a single patent application per year.53
The 1980s saw the development of a Chinese economy that seemed to
encourage mass infringement despite increased enforcement efforts. 4 China's
publishers' liberal and unauthorized reproductions of domestic and foreign
materials and rampant unauthorized use of the registered trademarks of foreign
and domestic companies soon attracted the attention and stoked the fears of the
international community.55
In the early 1990s, it was evident that China's new intellectual property
laws were effectively unenforceable. Moreover, administrative authorities had
very little guidance on how to proceed with resolving disputes.5 6 The new
trademark, patent and copyright laws allowed for recourse to the people's
courts but emphasized administrative solutions." The Copyright Law, for
example, included detailed administrative remedial measures, such as fines and
apologies, but little in the way of procedural guidance.58
In 1991, China was deemed the "single largest pirate world-wide,"
according to the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Joseph Massey."9
68 jurisdictions.
Id.
49. Id. at 84.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 85.
55. Id. at 86.
56. Id. at 76-77.
57. Foreigners have recourse to the court system in China, but only at the level of the intermediate
people's courts and above. For a discussion of China's judicial system and its relation to intellectual
property disputes, s e generally Naigen Zhang, Intellectual Property Law in China: Basic Policy and New
Developments, 4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L 1 (1997).
58. ALFOJD, supra note 6, at 80.

59. Id. at 86.
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The USTR moved to identify China as a "priority foreign country" and began
investigations for possible trade sanctions under the so-called Special 301
provisions of the recently amended Trade Act of 1974.' By classifying China
as a "priority foreign country," the United States was actually able to gain
leverage in ensuing negotiations over intellectual property concerns without
actually initiating a Special 301 action.6
Ensuing negotiations between the United States and China halted the
Special 301 investigation initiated by the USTR and ultimately resulted in the
landmark 1992 Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of
Intellectual Property (1992 MOU). 62 The 1992 MOU was the first agreement
signed by China that focused on legislation. 3 It required China to revise its
Patent Law to cover chemical inventions, to extend patent protection to 20
years, and to limit its use of compulsory licenses." Moreover, it required
China to accede to the Berne and Geneva Conventions and change its laws
accordingly." It also required China to enact regulations against unfair
competition in accordance with Article 10 i, of the Paris Convention."
Following the 1992 MOU, China acceded to the Berne Convention and the
Universal Copyright Convention in October 1992, and the Geneva Phonograms
Convention in April 1993.67 China amended all of its effected laws,
promulgated new patent regulations, acceded to the Patent Cooperation Treaty
in September 1993, and recognized the protection of computer software as
literary works according to relevant provisions of the Berne Convention." An
"Unfair Competition Law" was adopted in September 1993 according to the
provisions of the 1992 MOU, and China's Trademark Law was revised in
February 1993 to include, most notably, criminal penalties for trademark
violations.69
60. For an explanation and history of Special 301 and USTR procedure for bringing an action under
the provision, see generally Theodore H. Davis, Combating Piracy oflntellectual Property in International
Markets: A Proposed Modificationofthe Special 301 Action, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505 (1991).
61. Richard J. Ansson, Jr., International IntellectualProperty Rights. The United States, and The
People's Republic of China, 13 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 12 (1999).
62. Butterton, supra note 46, at 1084; see also Weiqiu Long, Intellectual Property in China, 31 ST.
MARY'S LIJ. 63,90 (1999).
63. Zhang, supra note 43, at 72-73.
64. Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992, U.S.P.R.C., 34 I.L.M. 676, 677-78 (1995). See also Zhang, supra note 43, at 73.
65. Zhang, supra note 42, at 73.
66. Id.
67. Butterton, supra note 46, at 1089.
68. Id.
69. Id at 1089-90.
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The 1992 MOU also saw the Chinese government stretching the bounds
of ostensible constitutional authority with respect to demands for increased
administrative protection for intellectual property.70 In a recent study of
China's intellectual property laws, Weiqiu Long questions the constitutional
basis for the government's sweeping reforms.7 ' He claims that the 1992 MOU
demanded too much of the government, especially with respect to the extension
of administrative power to protect pharmaceutical and agrochemical products
of the United States.72 His observations rest on the distinction between
regulations and laws, the latter being primary and the result of deliberation by
the National People's Congress (NPC) or its ancillary organs.' He claims that
"[t]hese types of regulations conflict with the Chinese Constitution because an
administrative regulation cannot create rights that are non-existing in current
law and legal principles."74 In other words, the United States has demanded
protection for rights that are not recognized by any legitimate constitutional
authority in China.75 This stretch of constitutional authority, however, seems
hardly a crisis for a constitutional system in which political values are
determined by the vicissitudes of CCP policies. Nevertheless, China's
willingness to make such legal concessions in response to outside pressures
marks an attitude of reform-minded political accommodation that must not go
unnoticed.
Despite the promulgation of new laws and China's accession to various
international conventions, these laws went unenforced. A new confrontation
between the United States and China was brewing, and in early 1995, USTR
Michael Kantor listed China as a "priority foreign country," and Special 301
investigations were resumed.7' China once again averted a trade war with the
United States by agreeing to a new bilateral accord, the 1995 Enforcement
Agreement, designed to eliminate the rampant piracy of intellectual property.7
70. Long, supra note 62, at 91.
71. Id. at 70-71; see also ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO KIANFA [Constitution] (1982).
72. See MURRAY ScoTT TANNER, THE POLITICS OF LAWMAKING INCHINA (1999), for an excellent
discussion of the NPC and the politics of lawmaking in China. For a discussion of the difference between
laws and regulations see Philip Baker, Party and Law in China, in STATE AND LAW INEASTERN ASIA

(1996).
73. Id.
74. Long, supra note 62, at 91.
75. Id.
76. Ansson, supra note 61, at 11.
77. Letter from Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, to Wu Yi, Minister of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation of the People's Republic of China (Annex I)(Feb. 26, 1995), reprinted in 34 I.L.M.
881 (1995). See also 1995 Trade Barriers Estimate, Office of the United States Trade Representative
(1995), at http://www.ustr.gov/html/995_china.html (visited April 1, 2001).
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The agreement included provisions to improve enforcement of China's new
intellectual property laws. It requires an inter-agency task force to conduct
raids on manufacturing and retail facilities, curtailing local protectionism.
Moreover, it bans the export of pirated products; it requires that all rules and
regulations be published, it requires the adoption of technical identification
systems for cataloging intellectual property rights, and it requires more
educational programs for China's lawyers, businessmen, and consumers
through various intellectual property publicity campaigns.' China pledged to
improve its Customs Service, in effect, modeling it on the U.S. Customs
Service, and in July 1995, the State Council promulgated a Regulation on
Customs Protection for Intellectual Property."
The 1995 Enforcement Agreement also included a plan for implementing
a comprehensive administration system that would expand the supervision of
intellectual property affairs to various State Council departments in charge of
science, technology, foreign trade, foreign affairs, press and publication,
broadcasting, film, television, justice, public security, patent, copyright,
industrial and commercial administration, customs, and the departments in
charge of the relevant industries. '0 This system was envisioned as leading to
comprehensive coverage and protection of intellectual property through the
eventual establishment ofprovincial, regional, and municipal working groups.
Through these groups, the relevant administrative authorities would coordinate
their activities in implementing and enforcing China's intellectual property
laws.8 1
Despite China's strong commitments to enforcement and a 1996 Foreign
Ministry statement extolling the marked improvements in protections for
intellectual property rights, piracy in China continued to grow.82 Piracy of CDROMs is said to have increased by one hundred percent in 1995, despite
Chinese claims to the contrary.83 In addition, piracy for motion pictures and

78. Butterton, supra note 46, at 1090-91.
79. Long, supra note 62, at 93.
80. Id. at 93; Butterton, supra note 46, at 1091.
81. Butterton, supra note 46, at 1092.
82. Id. at 1093. For example, 1995 losses for copyrighted materials alone were US$ 1.835 billion,
exclusive of losses for piracy of business software, up from US$ 866 million for 1994. Id. The 1996
National Trade Estimate for China reported losses to intellectual property violations for 1995 at
approximately $2.2 billion, in addition to losses suffered in third country markets. See, 1996 Trade
Barriers Estimate, Office of the United States Trade Representative (1996), at
http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/1996/china.html (visited Apr. 4, 2001).
83. Butterton, supra note 46, at 1094-95.
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computer software increased as well. 4
Estimates for the piracy of
entertainment software alone was about US$ 1.29 billion per year in 1996, and
illegal use of pirated software has continued unabated in state-owned
companies, government ministries, private companies, and among private
individuals."S
The United States began to doubt the ability of Beijing to implement the
1995 MOU and to question Beij ing's apparent reluctance to punish pirates, and
in May 1996, the USTR again declared China a "priority foreign country,"
threatening to impose $2 billion in trade sanctions for failure to comply with
the 1995 MOU.8 6 China averted these sanctions by conciliatory actions aimed
at establishing the structural changes envisioned by the agreement.87 In
addition, in August 1996, China issued Regulations on the Certification and
Protection of Famous Trademarks to attempt to bring its trademark regulations
up to par with WTO member countries.88 Also, China increased its
enforcement by conducting nationwide raids on manufacturing and distribution
networks of pirated products.8 9
Since 1997, China has initiated numerous measures to remedy enforcement
problems, and bring its intellectual property protections further in line with
WTO member nations.9 ° In April 1997, the United States Information
Technology Office finalized a cooperation agreement to perform title
verifications for the U.S. software industry in China, which allows U.S.
companies to monitor Chinese production of CD-ROMs." In 1998, the
government instituted the Patent Software User Recognition Plan to limit

84. Id. at 1095-97.
85. Id. at 1096.
86. Ansson, supra note 61, at 12.

87. This resulted in the signing of yet another intellectual property accord in June 1996, which
clarified the procedure China was to take in implementing the 1995 MOU. See, 1997 Trade Barriers
Estimate, Office of the United States Trade Representative 52 (1997); Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. In 1984 China became a permanent observer of meetings of the GAT Council, and attended the
Uruguay Round leading to the establishment of the WTO in 1994. There is little doubt that China has
viewed membership in the GATTIWTO as consistent with its new-found international standing and the full
acceptance of its part in the international economic conununity--something it has desired for two decades.
In this regard, China has been developing its Intellectual Property legal regime as a part of its aspirations
to become a major player in the international economy, and thus, to portray U.S. pressures as the sole
motivator of China's Intellectual Property laws would be misleading. For a discussion of the political and
economic incentives for China's membership in the GATr/WTO, see Stuart Harris, China s Role in the
WTO and APEC, in CHINA RISING, supra note 20, at 135-43.
91. Butterton, supra note 46, at 1090.
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The government also

established a new intellectual property office to oversee the legal protection of
intellectual property rights, to coordinate regulations and enforcement
mechanisms, and to implement international agreements. 93 In short, China has
shown an increased willingness to address those problems that led the USTR
to threaten trade sanctions in 1996, and has worked diligently to attempt to
bring its intellectual property laws up to par with WTO minimum standards.
Since 1995, China has established a system of intellectual property
protection that has come exceedingly close to achieving the minimal
substantive standards of the TRIPS Agreement.94 In a 1999 Trade Barriers
Estimate by the USTR, China's intellectual property protection received a
favorable review.
Based on the 1995 and 1996 bilateral IPR agreements and
extensive follow-up work with the Chinese officials, China
now has a functioning system to protect intellectual property
rights (IPR). Enforcement of intellectual property has become
part of China's nationwide anti-crime campaign; the Chinese
police and court system have become actively involved in
combating IPR piracy. According to Chinese Government
statistics, China seized some 35 million illegal audio-visual
products from 1994 to year-end 1998. It has shut down or
fined 74 assembly operations for pirated VCDs and seized
over 20 million smuggled VCDs during the same period.9"
In a recent assessment by the International Institute for Economics, China
received a good rating for its intellectual property protection.96 However,
despite the November 1999 bilateral agreement between the United States and
92. Long, supra note 62.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 97. For an overview of the TRIPS agreement, see WTO Intellectual Property, at
http://www.wto.org/wto/english/tratope/tripse/intel2_e.htm. Also for an economic assessment ofChina's
accession to the WTO, and an assessment of its impact on the economic and policy interests of the U.S. and
China, see Daniel H. Rosen, China and the World Trade Organization: An Economic Balance Sheet,
Institute for International Economics, International Economics Policy Briefs (June 1999), at
http://www.iie.com/NEWSLETR/news99-6.htm. Fora discussion of recent copyright reforms and TRIPS
compatibility, see Long, supra note 62, at 93-97.
95. 1999 Trade Barriers Estimate, Office of the United States Trade Representative 61 (1999), at
http://www.ustr.gov/pdf/1999_china.pdf. (visited Apr. 4,2001). See also Long, supra note 61.
96. Id. at 10.
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China for admittance into the WTO, there are still several areas of concern
regarding China's intellectual property protection that have bearing on China's
compliance with WTO standards.97
One potential problem is that China's administrative legal regime lacks the
procedural transparency expected of WTO countries by virtue of the 1994
WTO draft protocol.98 This protocol supplements the prior requirements of
Article X of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It
essentially requires institutional transparency arrangements, such as the
publication of all regulations and the enforcement of only published laws or
regulations, or independent review of administrative actions regarding trade
issues." 9 The Ministry of Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) has
established a legal gazette for the publication ofregulations and administrative
rules related to trade, but the gazette does not include the important "normative
documents" that announce policy changes affecting the administration of
existing rules and regulations." °
As a result, administrative rules and
regulations remain opaque, general, and all too susceptible to the vicissitudes
of party policy.''
Additional problem areas include the non-existence of a feedback loop, or
consultation loop with either the general public or foreigners, and a lack of
judicial review.' An important feature of the transparency requirements of
the WTO protocol is the "right of comment," or public consultation.' 3 Some
consultation may take place during legislative drafting, but virtually no such
consultation occurs during the drafting of lower level administrative rules and
regulations. t " China's lack of judicial review is another major obstacle in
achieving transparency, an obstacle that reflects a mere separation of
administrative functions rather than a true separation of powers.0 China's
local courts are often staffed by poorly trained judges, some of whom have
little, if any, formal legal training, and tend to have strong personal and

97. See Joseph Fewsmith, China and the WTO: The PoliticsBehind the Agreement, National Bureau
of Asian Research Report (November 1999), at http://www.nbr.org/publications/report.html.
98. See Sylvia Ostry, Chinaand the WTO: The TransparencyIssue, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. I, 12 (1998).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 13.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Marrikesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994,33 I.IM.
1144 (1994), art. XII. See also Ostry, supra note 98, at 13.
104. Id. at 13-14.
105. Idat 14.
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professional ties to the local community.'" Local protectionism and an
inability to secure reliable information for the effective resolution of
commercial disputes have become major problems.' °7 The WTO dispute
settlement mechanism relies on evidence often gathered by local courts and
administrative agencies, and local protectionism could pose major problems
for the effective collection of important information.'0 8
Some scholars suggest that the establishment of a WTO-compatible
administrative system in China will require more than mere mechanics, and
will require the establishment of the rights-based regime said to be lacking in
China.' 0" For example, Alford suggests that a system of state determination
that inhibits the free flow of ideas is "fundamentally incompatible with one of
strong intellectual property rights in which individuals have the authority to
determine how expressions of their ideas may be used and ready access to
private legal remedies to vindicate such rights."" 0 To the extent that the WTO
represents the ideological interests of the United States and other Western
nations, one would expect that support for China's admission to the WTO
would be billed as a victory for liberal and democratic values, in addition to
being a victory for western economic interests."'
On August 25, 2000, China adopted a revised version of the Patent Law,
and the government is currently considering revisions to its Copyright and
Trademark laws that would bring them into full compliance with the TRIPS
agreement." 2 China's 1991 Copyright Law is in conflict with the TRIPS
agreement in three areas that are likely to be addressed in an upcoming revision.
First, TRIPS Article 13 provides that exceptions for exclusive rights can only
be confined to areas that do not conflict with the "normal exploitation of the
work," which, while ambiguous, may require a refimement of "fair use"
106. Id.at15.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109.
d.at18.
110. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 119.
111. Forexample, California Representative David Drier called China's admission to the WTO a "winwin-win for American workers, American businesses, and American values." See Eric Schmitt, White
House Says Votes are Lacking on Chinese Trade, N.Y.TIMES, March 10, 2000, at Al. For a discussion
of the WTO and human rights, see Steve Chamovitz, Symposium: The Universal Declaration ofHuman
Rights at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets:The Globalization of Economic Human Rights, 25
BROOKLYN J.INT'L L. 113, 113 (1999). See also, The Clinton Administration Statement on Permanent
Normal TradeRelationsfor China,available at http://www.mac.doc.gov/china (last visited May 14,2001).
112. For a discussion of issues ofcurrent concern, see Zheng Chengsi, WTO and Chinese IP Laws, in
CHINA PATENTS & TRADEMARKS Iand 1U(2000); Jeffrey Layman, IPR Protection after WTO: Copyright
Law and Enforcement Under the TRIPs Agreement, in China WTO: Shaping the Future (David Packer
ed., 2000).
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standards in the upcoming revision. Second, Article 11 of TRIPS provides that
members must provide copyright holders with an exclusive right to prohibit
commercial rental or copying of copyrighted works, a right that is not clearly
defined in China's Copyright Law or the 1992 Provisions on the
Implementation of the International Copyright Treaties."3 Third, the
enforcement provisions of TRIPS require the availability of appropriate
remedies for aggrieved parties, but China's Copyright Law lacks a similar
provision, and reports of arbitrary damage awards ordered by Chinese judges
may indicate the necessity of such a provision in the upcoming revision. In
addition, China's 1993 Trademark Law will require certain modifications,
particularly in the area of protection of well-known marks. "'
Since 1978, China has created a system of intellectual property laws that,
facially resembles the intellectual property legal regimes of most WITO member
states by virtue of substantive "rights" recognized, and the apparent protections
afforded to the owners of such rights. China's upcoming intellectual property
law revisions will be minor compared to the changes that were instituted in the
1980s and 1990s, and are likely to reflect more technical substantive
calibrations to TRIPS than any wide sweeping change. Many critics, however,
especially those that assume a liberal democratic "rule of law" perspective to
assess the success of China's reforms-an ideal that is informed by an effective
"constitutional" system--will continue to raise concerns over the ability of the
current regime to effectively protect intellectual property rights." 5 The regime
has been criticized as creating legal institutions but not a "legal system;"" 6 as
interpreting "rule of law" as "rule by law;""' 7 and as perpetuating an
increasingly alienated legal culture by passing laws that are essentially
unenforceable." 8 The politics behind the creation of intellectual property
protection in China are complex, but have served the interests of the United
States by securing the legal groundwork for the meaningful protection of
American intellectual property in China, while also transforming the Chinese
intellectual property landscape into familiar territory.I"
China's admission to the WTO may be heralded as a victory for Western
113.

See, e.g., Shishi Guoji Zhuzuoquan Tiaoyue De Guiding art. 14 (Cn.).

114. See 2000 Trade Barriers Estimate, Office of the United States Trade Representative 50 (2000),
at http://www.ustr.gov/pdf/2000 china.pdf (visited Apr. 4,2001).
115. See, e g., Ostry, supra note 98; ALFORD, supra note 6; Ockosupranote 13.
116. Ostry, supra note 98, at 14-15, citing Stanley B. Lubman, There"s No Rushing China s Slow
March to a Rule of Law, LA. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1997, at M2.
117. Id.at 15.
118. See Potter, supra note 2.
119. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 118-19.
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economic-and perhaps "moral'-interests in China. But such claims are
misleading since they overlook persistent differences in political culture that
pervade the legal and socio-economic landscape in which intellectual property
protections are realized. In addition, these claims ignore cultural differences
that may greatly effect the development of an ideal rights-based intellectual
property regime. Alford, in his assessment of U.S. policy toward China
concerning intellectual property, comes to a similar conclusion.
[I]n its choice of means and ends, the United States has, in
effect, devoted considerable diplomatic capital to securing
concessions that fail meaningfully to speak to the chief
impediments to the development in China of respect for
legality and, through it, of a greater commitment to the
protection of intellectual property rights. 2 '
III. BASIC ISSUES AFFECTING THE FUTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT INCHINA
Since beginning its reforms in 1978, China has overcome numerous
obstacles in establishing its current intellectual property system, a system that
promises the same protections of WTO member countries. But critics point to
a number of persistent social, political, economic, and basic cultural constraints
to China's ability to develop an efficient system of intellectual property
protection that tend to receive little attention in China and in the West. These
constraints include the development of regionalism and local protectionism, a
growing divide between regime ideas of socialist legality and popular
conceptions of justice, the alleged paucity of "rights" consciousness, and the
lack of a political culture to support a legal system to properly enforce legal
rights and entitlements.
Perhaps one of the greatest problems that Beijing faces in administering its
intellectual property regime is the result of China's economic
development-namely, decentralization, regionalism, and the development of
local "duke economies."'' Indeed, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh
Central Committee in 1978 encouraged local political autonomy and the

120.
121.

Id. at 118.
See CHINA DECONSTRUCTS: POLUnCS, TRADE AND REGIONASM (David S.G. Goodman, et al.

eds., 1994).
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The combination of
decentralization of economic management.' 22
decentralization and market forces have contributed to a phenomena in which
the centers of economic power have moved away from Beijing and the political
center to the localities. 23 Coastal and border areas have been encouraged to use
their geo-political locations and comparative advantages for trade and foreign
investment with the outside world.""
Some scholars have suggested that this arrangement may ultimately lead to
political disintegration through such mechanisms as bureaucratic fragmentation.
Moreover, it may diffuse bureaucratic interests and contribute to the
development of local economic parochialisms. 125 David Goodman and Gerald
Segal, however, argue that the tensions between the center and the regions are
not necessarily harbingers of political disintegration.'2 6 They argue that the
CCP has always encouraged a degree of elasticity in national policy
implementation and has combined regional political leadership with local
flexibility to "ensure that regionalism has been a constant feature of China's7
political process and not necessarily a symptom of political disintegration.'
Nevertheless, China's ability to enforce its intellectual property laws on its
own territory has been effected by the decentralization of economic power, the
complexity and inefficiency of its administrative system, and the tendency for
courts to protect local interests. 28 The complex administrative plan
contemplated by the 1995 Enforcement Agreement was intended to remedy
some of the problems of intellectual property enforcement through a centrally
122. See Communique, supra note 1, at 23-24.
123. See CHINA DECONSTRUCTS, supra note 121, at 2-7.
124. Id. One important example of this phenomenon was the creation of "special economic zones"
and "open cities" as test centers for market liberalization. In a speech to the Thirteenth Congress of the
CCP in October 1987, Zhao Ziyang outlined a trajectory of economic reform that became the general model
for market opening. See Zhao Ziyang, AdvanceAlongthe Road ofSocialism withChinese Characteristics,
in THE CHINA READER, supra note 2, at 50, 68.
In pursuing reform, we must stress experimentation, encourage exploration, seek
practical interim methods and measures, and advance one step at a time. Because
conditions are different in different areas, we cannot simply ask all areas to do the
same thing at the same time. In the autonomous minority nationality areas and
outlying districts in particular, we should adopt prudent measures which suit the
local conditions, while in the special economic zones we can afford to be more
flexible.
Id. Although Zhao was purged in 1989, much of his economic agenda was subsequently adopted-while
his radical ideas for political reform were abandoned. Id.
125. See CHINA DECONSTRUCTS, supra note 121. See also Michael D. Swaine, China Faces the
1990 's: A System in Crisis, in THE CHINA READER, supra note 2, at 103, 103.
126. See CHINA DECONSTRUCTS, supra note 121, at 3-18.
127. Id.at 4.
128. See e.g., id. at 343-45; see also Ocko, supra note 13, at 557.
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coordinated system. But the underlying tensions persist, and Beijing most likely
will continue to face difficulty enforcing international accords on its own
territory.129
Beijing has found that it has little control over some of the most important
elements of its foreign economic policy. Goodman and Segal suggest that
control over some aspects of the regime's foreign relations power has also been
decentralized, and "no one, except assorted individuals acting independently,
has taken up that power."'"3
This exacerbates the development of an
increasingly alienated legal culture and further limits Beijing's ability to control
the proverbial tiger of intellectual property reform. This may lead to persistent
enforcement problems even after China's entry into the WTO. Although
Beijing has increased the relative efficiency of its administrative apparatus, it
still must rely on local authorities and administration to provide important data
and to ensure the protection of intellectual property rights. Perhaps the best
way for the United States and other foreign actors to secure their interests in
China is to focus on the localities.'' Goodman and Segal advise, "[i]f the
outside world seriously believes that it can best accommodate China's rising
power by weaving it into webs of interdependence, then the strongest webs will
be built on regional and local lines."'3
Economic and bureaucratic decentralization, and the relative fragmentation
of central power over regional economic actors, may also contribute to China's
increasingly alienated legal culture and further inflame the regime's legitimacy
problems. The regime's inability to centralize control over China's vast
economy and to effectively coordinate the enforcement of its new laws and
regulations accentuates the differences between Beijing's ideas about socialist
legality and popular notions of justice. China's lack of an effective
constitutional system that fosters public dialogue about political values isolates
the regime from the people it claims to govern. Potter claims that in post-Mao
China, regime notions of justice reflect the idea that "relationships within
society are considered just based on compliance with state rules and procedures
rather than on substantive conditions and consequences."' 33 Potter claims that
129. See CHINA DECONSTRUCTS, supra note 121, at 344.
130. Id. at 343.
131. The 1997 title verification agreement with the U.S. Information Technology Office maybe a step
in this direction. See Ansson, supra note 61, at 13. This agreement allows U.S. software companies to
monitor individual Chinese CD-ROM plants across the country, thereby committing the U.S. to a more
proactive and local involvement in the enforcement of intellectual property rights in China. Id.
132. CHINA DECONSTRUCTS, supra note 121, at 352.
133. Potter, supra note 2, at 341.
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regime ideals of justice inform regime notions about political inequality by
reference to formal laws and regulations, "an approach strengthened further by
the regime's control over the process of regulatory enactment and
dissemination."" Rampant piracy, local protectionism, selective enforcement,
and minimal damage awards may suggest a disjunction between official and
popular views of justice, undermine regime efforts to create a system of
effective intellectual property protection, and challenge regime legitimacy by
perpetuating the alienation of legal culture. Potter claims that a wide gap exists
between popular and regime ideals of legality and justice, a gap that poses
significant challenges to regime attempts to derive political legitimacy from
hollow legal reforms.'
The Kellogg's Corn Flakes case is perhaps a good example of the
complexities of enforcement in light of China's unique political and legal
landscape. In 1994, Kellogg sued a Chinese company selling cereal in
packaging that was essentially identical to the packaging used by
Kellogg-from a transliteration of the Kellogg name written in its distinctive
script, to famous Kellogg copyrighted slogans replicated on the box.'36 In a
lower Chinese court, Kellogg lost its case for trademark infringement. The
lower court, relying on a "tendentious line of reasoning and reading of the
evidence," '37 not only found for the Chinese party, but ordered Kellogg to pay
court costs and damages.
Kellogg then appealed to the provincial high court, which, just after the
United States and China signed the 1995 MOU, overturned the initial decision.
Although the high court provided sound legal reasons, critics suggest that the
court acted with instruction from political authorities. 3 ' If the critics are
correct in their evaluation, this case may be illustrative of several of the points
discussed above. First, it exemplifies the tendency of lower level courts to favor
local interests, even ifthe court lacks sufficient evidence to support its decision.
Second, the outcome at the court of first instance may be further justified by a
jurisprudential emphasis on the centrality of legal formalism and procedural
compliance over the substantive consequences or equitable nature of the
outcome. 3 9 And third, the ultimate outcome illustrates the absence ofjudicial
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
doctrines

Id.
Id at 338-41.
Ocko, supra note 13, at 577.
Id.
Id.
Ideals of justice in post-Mao China have tended to on the enforcement of state law and the
of legal equality and political inequality that lay their foundation. Potter claims
the influence of regime views on legal equality has created a preoccupation with
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independence, regardless of whether, as in this case, it actually proved
favorable for U.S. businesses. 40
Scholars often argue that at the root of China's inability to ensure adequate
protections for intellectual property, and perhaps the root of Beijing's inability
to curtail widespread piracy and flouting of its intellectual property laws, is the
fact that China has historical and cultural roots that are profoundly different
from Western countries, and that such roots militate against the establishment
of an effective intellectual property rights system in China. 4' Alford claims
that "laws premised on the values and institutions of an economically advanced
capitalist democracy will not generate identical results when transplanted to a
different setting. Rules that presume an independent judiciary, a
professionalized bar, powerful interest groups and a rights-conscious populace
fall chiefly on deaf ears in contemporary China."' 42
Some scholars claim that a rights consciousness is sorely lacking in China,
and the lack of such a consciousness explains, at least in part, how some
Western legal notions are incommensurable with Chinese sensibilities.
Peerenboom suggests that rights consciousness entails "a culture of rights, an
attitude among the people that the government cannot do to them as it
wishes.' 43 Peerenboom and others have suggested that Chinese Confucianinfluenced ideas of propriety (i) and personal relationships (guanxi) trump
foundationalist claims to natural rights.'" In addition, the Chinese term for
rights, quanli-the first character, quan, meaning to weigh or balance, and li,
meaning interests or selfish interests-literally implies a weighing or balancing
of interests, an etemology that "lends itself to a conception of rights understood
as contingent interests rather than as moral principles.' ' 4 Peerenboom claims
legal formalism as the criterion for findings ofjustice. This has led not only to the
problem of regarding the content of laws and regulations as equivalent to practice,
but also to formalistic reliance on institutions and procedures without regard for
substantive justice.
Potter, supra note 2, at 338.
140. In this case, the government is apparently making a policy statement in opposition to local
interests. It is precisely situations such as this that cause critics to allege that China's legal system is best
characterized as "rule by law" as opposed to "rule of law"---or in Potter's terms, the use of law as an
instrument of rule rather than a set of independently applicable legal principles. It is in this context that the
policies whose enforcement is sought through formalistic compliance with state rules and legal procedures
are assumed to be a priori just. See id. at 338-41.
141. ALFORD, supra note 6; Ocko, supra note 13. But see, Butterton, supra note 46.
142. William P. Alford, Pressuring the Pirate, L.A. TIMES, Jan 12, 1992, at 5, available at WL
2993460, quoted in Butterton, supra note 46, at 1107.
143. Peerenboom, supra note 29, at 35.
144. See Id. at 44-47; see also DAVID HALL& ROGERAMES, THINKING THROUGH CONFUCIUS (1987).
145. Peerenboom, supra note 37, at 365-66. Note that the term li in quanli is not the same as that

2001]

POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA

473

that this reading of quanli is consistent with Confucian social ideals, and
according to Confucious, the proverbial sage ruler (junzi) was to do the
The upshot of such claims is that these Confucian-influenced
balancing."
ideas are present in current political and legal discourse, affect current Chinese
political thought, and stifle the development of a Western-styled rights based
legal system in China. Randale Edwards claims that "China's leaders today,
like the imperial and bureaucratic rulers of the past, hold that rights flow from
the state in the form of a gratuitous grant that can be subjected to conditions or
abrogation by unilateral decision of the state."' 47 This is in contrast to Western
notions of the state as the protector of natural human rights or rights to private
property. In short, Chinese political and cultural sensibility does not lend itself
to a respect for legality and for rights as these things are conceived of in the
West, and because of this, rights in China will always be "rights with Chinese
characteristics"-characteristics that may be incommensurable with their
Western counterparts.'"
But claims of cultural incommensurability may provide only a small, and
perhaps insignificant, portion of the debate concerning the development of a
workable system of intellectual property protection in China. Culture is never
monolithic and simple rational narratives are of limited use, especially in
contexts where economic, political, social, and cultural discourses collide. For
instance, Glen Butterton argues that economic forces may offset the effect of
cultural constraints in the Chinese context. 4 9 In economic terms, lax
enforcement produces huge disincentives for advanced industries to invest in,
or transfer technology to states that encourage or tolerate piracy. 50 Butterton
claims that, "in the developing country context, public and private actors would
do well to foster institutions and practices that will generate respect for
intellectual property rights, and encourage foreign investment by advanced
intellectual property producers."'' China has, arguably, made great strides in
this regard and has shown encouraging signs that respect for such rights is
growing. China also shows signs that an effective institutional infrastructure
is developing. But China's transformation from a system that "effectively
translated as "propriety" above.
146.

Id. at 366.
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HUMAN RIGHTS INCONTEMPORARY CHINA 41, 44-45 (R. Randale Edwards et al.eds., 1986). See also
Peerenboom, supra note 29, at 40.
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subsidizes piracy and taxes adherence to law, to one which effectively
subsidizes adherence to the law and taxes piracy"'52 depends as much on the
ability of an increasingly alienated regime to induce popular assimilation of an
intellectual property system that may, in some respects, be a political and
cultural mismatch, as it does on economic forces that support a cost-benefit
analysis in favor of protection. Perhaps, in light of the regimes current
legitimation crisis, reliance on something other than rule of law-e.g., economic
development-would be a wise choice, if that choice has not already been
made. 53
' But, as suggested in evaluations by both Potter and White, the regime
is riding a tiger that may prove virtually impossible to dismount.'54
Alford, in his assessment of the development of intellectual property laws
in China, argues that China's political culture is the most important factor in
explaining the "relative insignificance of the idea of intellectual property in the
Chinese world."' 55 Alford's idea of political culture emphasizes the central
importance of state control over the flow of ideas for purposes of legitimation
and power in China, 56 an emphasis that informs the realization and
interpretation of the "constitutional essentials" of democracy, rule of law, and
human rights.'"" Although political culture is subject to continual evolution and
change, Alford doubts that the passage of laws, and the creation of a complex
apparatus to enforce those laws, can-by itself-affect any real significant and
lasting change in China.'58 He claims that the beginning of such change is
evident, but "the state's ambivalence about the very rights it has been busy
creating, and its concomitant hesitance to cede to individuals a greater capacity
for enforcing them, raises questions as to the potential of such steps genuinely
to transform fundamental tenets of Chinese political culture."' 59
Both China and the United States agree that China's membership in the
WTO is an inevitable step toward integrating China and its economy more fully
into the international political and economic order. Membership in the WTO
will limit the ability of the United States to use Special 301 and other unilateral
mechanisms to pressure China into complying with U.S. interests without

152. Id. at 1118.
153. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 10.
154. See Potter, supra note 2, at 325; see also WHITE, supra note 10.
155. ALFORD, supra note 6 at 119.
156. Id.
157. See Davis, Constitutionalismand PoliticalCulture: The Debate OverHuman Rights andAsian
Values, supra note 28, at 138.
158. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 120.
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involving the dispute resolution mechanisms of the WTO.1 This will change
the rules of engagement between the United States and China and provide both
countries with a "neutral" context for solving intellectual property disputes.' 6
But it is doubtful that admission to the WTO will produce the political and
"moral" changes in China that many scholars see as necessary for the
development of a truly effective system of intellectual property protection.
Thus, China is likely to encounter ongoing difficulties in this regard. 62 Perhaps
the conditions that are necessary for success in the current global economy are
precisely those conditions that breed protection for intellectual property in the
domestic context-perhaps a particular species of Western political culture' 63
Nevertheless, China's regime has a rough ride ahead and it is in the interests
of the United States and the international community to see that China
overcomes its current problems and that the future of intellectual property
protection in China is a bright one indeed.
VI. CONCLUSION

China has developed a system of intellectual property protection that, for
the most part, meets the substantive standards of most WTO member states.
However, China's political culture-a culture that stifles the free flow of ideas
and fails to support a transparent legal system-as well as its bureaucratic and
economic decentralization, may hinder its ability to establish a truly effective
system despite its apparent compliance with international substantive standards.
So long as the regime seeks increased involvement in an international economic
order that champions ideas and values of Western liberal democracies, the
outside and inside pressures on the regime to account for its differences in the
160. See, eg., David B. Dreyfus, Confucianism and CompactDiscs:Alternative Dispute Resolution
and its Role in the Protectionof United States Intellectual PropertyRights in China, 13 OHIO ST. J.ON
DISP. RESOL. 947, 959-961 (1998). See generally, WTO IntellectualProperty,supra note 94 (providing
an overview of dispute settlement procedures under TRIPS).
161. See Dreyfus, supra note 160, at 959-61. Some critics, however, have argued that the U.S. will be
forced to rely on Special 301-type unilateral measures to give effect to the provisions of TRIPS because the
WTO dispute settlement process will ultimately prove to be inadequate. See Robert J. Pechman, Seeking
MultilateralProtectionfor IntellectualProperty: The United States "TRIPS" over Special 301, 7 MINN.
J.GLOBAL TRADE 179 (1998).
162. Beijing's desire and willingness to join the WTO entails a commitment to sustaining substantial
political and short-term economic costs. These political and economic concessions are offset by a belief
that international economic interdependence does not necessitate the social and political changes of a
"Western liberal kind." Harris, supranote 90, at 152. For an argument that a homogenization of domestic
political forms is necessary in the evolution of an international society, see generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA,
THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1993).
163. See ALFORD, supra note 6, at 123.

476

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 8:449

success of legal and economic reform will be more and more difficult to
sustain, especially if the ultimate success of these reforms is dependent on a
change in political culture. The significance of this conclusion is likely to be
debated ad infinitum by economists, political scientists, and cultural studies
scholars. But one thing remains clear, as the current regime continues to use
legal institutions to maintain its political dominance, grants of legal equality,
and legally recognized rights will be continually susceptible to the whims of
CCP politics.
The enforcement of substantive standards has been and remains a primary
concern for the Chinese government and for the United States-a concern that
is rooted in the regime's current legitimation crisis and apparent inability to
control its localities. But regime ideas ofjustice, emphasizing compliance over
substantive conditions or consequences, may actually perpetuate problems of
local favoritism when enforcement is sought in local courts. In short, China's
unique political culture, socio-economic constraints, and complex bureaucracy
places enormous limits on the regimes ability to ensure an efficient system of
domestic intellectual property protection.
The politics of imagining intellectual property rights in China has been
limited by outside pressures on the regime to fashion intellectual property laws

on U.S. terms, and on domestic pressures to pass laws that ensure the ongoing
successes of economic development without compromising regime power and
legitimacy. Economic conditions and incentives seem to have created the
conditions for the development of and a respect for a growing intellectual
property rights consciousness despite alleged cultural obstacles to the contrary.
But some scholars suggest that further political liberalization and a greater
commitment to the institutions, personnel, and values needed to support a rights
based legality are necessary for any real lasting change.' Alford states,
The challenges so posed are daunting, for by its very nature,
political culture comprises enduring values and practices
central to a nation's identity, which foreigners, perforce,
should not too readily assume they have either the moral
authority or capacity meaningfully to influence. Nonetheless,
it is here that attention should be focused, for a state that
encounters serious difficulties in protecting its citizens' basic
civil and political rights is unlikely to be able to protect their
164.
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property rights, which in turn means that it will be even less
likely to protect the highly sophisticated property interests of
foreigners. 65
China has made great strides toward developing an effective system of
intellectual property protection, but the future of intellectual property
enforcement ultimately depends on how China will contend with the social,
political, and economic challenges that it currently faces.
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